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ABSTRACT 
If the technological situation is unique, the ways to understand the contemporary moral 
condition are not. We link it to age-old questions: in fact, the power promised by technol-
ogy only establishes a new form of human finitude. In the face of this continuity of the 
fundamental moral condition, we examine a number of alternative ways of thinking 
about the basis of responsible innovation, exploring the metaphors of quasi-parental and 
political responsibilities, as well as the place of virtue in innovation and the role of cul-
tural narratives in helping us understand the limits of responsible innovation. 
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The problem of responsible innovation stems from a contradiction that af-
fects the social authority possessed by scientific knowledge. This is the con-
tradiction between the promise of knowledge without intrinsic limits, and 
the limits that actually emerge when the products of this knowledge, in the 
form of technology, generate radical uncertainty about the future. Human 
desire is yet another part of the human condition that also possesses no in-
trinsic limits. Unconstrained by the voice of reason, passions can reinforce 
themselves with unbounded strength for an indefinite period of time. They 
provoke emotions, whose contribution to moral judgement stands on a par 
with the input of a consequentialist calculation of costs and benefits associ-
ated with one’s action. Hence the necessity to take them into account in ad-
dressing the problems of responsible innovation. 
The 20th century was replete with reflections and reactions on what was 
perceived as the failed promises of rational science and the enlightened man. 
From the Holocaust and the Gulag on the social side, to Chernobyl, Fuku-
shima, the debacle of GMOs, intrusions of privacy, and contaminated medi-
cines (from haemophilia blood products in the 1980s to cardiac drugs in the 
2010s) on the technological side, all of these catastrophic events involved the 
unforeseen consequences of technological innovation as either leading vec-
tors or helpful mediators of evil. The psychological and moral experiences 
that these events induced in human societies had a traumatic character 
(Frankl 1946), in which the claims of a trusted authority were unexpectedly 
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found to be untrustworthy – thus disrupting widely held cultural assump-
tions about the place of science in society as a reliable interpreter of the 
world. Yet most societies still react with hope and excitement to the promise 
of new technologies, even as they preserve the memory of past technological 
catastrophes. Thus the traumatic loss of trust continues to reverberate to 
this day. 
One of the temptations of this trauma is to see it as total and irrevoca-
ble, marking out a radical discontinuity between the present of ‘open-source’ 
science and the past ‘ivory-tower’ science, and one that – to return to epis-
temological issues – discloses insurmountable gaps in knowledge that mean 
we cannot predict what our actions will mean to future generations. The ex-
istence of this radical separation between us and them is one way of reading 
Hans Jonas’s (1984) remark that we, as members of technological societies, 
bear a historically unprecedented responsibility to future generations. If this 
responsibility is genuinely unprecedented, then to be genuinely responsible 
innovators, do we need to innovate in the realm of responsibility too, per-
haps to the extent of entirely jettisoning the ethical traditions we have in-
herited? Yet such a conclusion may lead us nowhere. If we decide we need an 
entirely new kind of responsibility, then our decision leaves us amidst the 
ruins of old concepts of responsibility carefully distilled in the course of hu-
man history, without any obvious path to take.  
As an alternative, one option is to simply reverse the standards of proof, 
and make ‘being responsible’ identical with ‘being precautionary’. One could 
demand (to take things to an extreme) that innovators provide evidence that 
their innovations are safe with complete certainly even where potential 
harms are scientifically recognised to be merely plausible. This is, however, 
insufficient for an account of moral responsibility. Although the precaution-
ary principle is based on an acknowledgement of the pervasiveness of uncer-
tainty, by itself it represents little more than a negative version of foresight-
based consequentialism: grounding decisions on worst-case scenarios still re-
quires that we foresee what these might be, and that we make a judgement 
whether the benefits of acting are “proportionately” better than the poten-
tial hazards of doing so (Dupuy 2007). 
Without any firm guidelines on when exactly precaution must end, we 
are left caught between an unjustifiable policy of precaution and an unjusti-
fiable policy of laissez-faire. The ever-present possibility of paralysis between 
these options drives home the importance of emotional reaction to innova-
tion and with it the analogy between the trauma of scientific authority and 
individual trauma: just as an individual trauma sufferer may retreat entirely 
from the world, unable to deal with its demands, societies may demand that 
technologies – or individual researchers – be certified as being entirely inno-
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cent, as being either free from potential hazards or being required to extend 
their foresight through additional research to ferret out every possibility of 
harm. Even more radically, voices may be raised against technological ra-
tionality as such, representing scientific knowledge as infected with a will to 
exploitation and even totalitarianism. Counterposed to these demands are 
often found consequentialist responses from exasperated scientists: there is 
no innovation without risk, so if you want the benefits of new technologies, 
accept the risks! Such responses, however, miss the point: in technological 
experiences of trauma, the authority of confident pronouncements about the 
balance between ‘benefits’ and ‘risks’ is precisely what is at issue. 
What is needed is a recognition that our situation, although technologi-
cally unprecedented in the history of humanity, is not ethically unprece-
dented, and rather than simply inventing new decision rules which individu-
als or organisations can apply, we need to look back and seek to learn from 
the moral thought of the past about styles of ethical thought which can be 
effectively applied to our present, “passionate” situation. 
It is first of all important to note that, contrary to a commonly held 
view that a victim of wrongdoing of any kind enjoys a superior moral stand-
ing over the ordinary man, being vulnerable does not equate with being 
right, nor being righteous. Victimhood caused by the feeling of vulnerability 
does not suffice on its own to determine the meaning of action, but merely 
serves as one of its motivations. As Robert Musil wrote, “Even a sex-
murderer is, in some cranny of his soul, full of inner hurt and hidden appeals; 
somehow the world is wronging him like a child, and he does not have the 
capacity to express this in any other way than the way he has found works 
for him. In the criminal there is both a vulnerability and a resistance against 
the world, and both are present in every person who has a powerful moral 
destiny” (Musil 1990/1913, p. 39) Hence the need, once the moral dimensions 
of vulnerability explored, to add to our ethical thinking a different compo-
nent taking us beyond a mere observation of this condition. However we 
first focus on vulnerability as a factor of individual responsibility. 
We can make a useful comparison between a parental duty of care and a 
similar duty which might be appropriate for innovators, based on an anal-
ogy between ‘naturalised’ technologies (technologies, that is, with something 
like an autonomous existence of their own) and children. We might say that 
parents are required to care for children in such a way as to encourage cer-
tain kinds of character traits and behaviours aligned with social norms. Par-
ents may be thought of as having a duty to future people (and to their chil-
dren’s contemporaries) not to raise offspring who ignore their responsibilities 
to others.  Their responsibility to future people is therefore mediated by their 
responsibilities to their children, and vice versa. Further, the role of parent is 
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without the kinds of well-defined limits we may expect to find drawn around 
an occupation, to which explicit role responsibilities might attach. What 
characterises the role of parent is, first, caring for a child’s capabilities and 
ensuring that they are given the opportunities to develop them, which re-
quires a thickly detailed understanding of what makes for a valuable set of 
such capacities (or a ‘good character’, if you prefer). The parent is not ex-
pected to have the capacity of superior foresight regarding future conse-
quences, which is an expectation that technological societies both promote 
and undermine. The capacities required are other than this, belonging to the 
set of personal characteristics that has traditionally been called ‘virtues’. 
The purpose of raising children on this pattern is to make them fit them for 
adulthood, for relative, then full, autonomy and for taking responsibility on 
their own account. 
Are innovators parents of their innovations in this sense? As they are 
unleashed to live a “life” of their own in a complex world, technologies can 
develop a certain autonomy – though one that obviously does not make 
them identical to human children, particularly because technological inno-
vation carries an aura of novelty that human procreation does not. However 
obvious virtues can be formulated in the ordinary language of moral values 
rather than technical specifications: to rephrase the slogan promoted by one 
technological company, not only the innovator but technology itself must 
not “be evil”. Those involved in research and development therefore par-
take, in many ways, in preparing their technological children for maturity – 
although we should note that if naturalised technological artefacts with the 
potential for unforeseeable interference effects are children, then they are 
certainly endowed with a special social status – not truly alive yet decidedly 
not simply inanimate slaves… 
We see the problems that arise from such an “infantilisation” of tech-
nology in the precautionary tendencies of contemporary governance of inno-
vation. For example, the European Code of Conduct for Responsible 
Nanosciences and Nanotechnologies Research contains a principle of ac-
countability that reflects the traumatized precautionary stance we examined 
above: “Researchers and research organizations should remain accountable 
for the social, environmental and human health impacts that their research 
[in nanosciences and nanotechnologies] may impose on present and future 
generations” (European Commission 2008). The reference to future genera-
tions without any time limit for accountability, from the point of view of 
consequentialist ethics, subjects the innovator-parent to unbounded hazards 
of moral luck (Nagel 1979; Williams 1981). It is notable that we do not ac-
cept such infantilisation of technology in relation to many past inventions. 
Today, we do not hold the inventor of the locomotive, telephone, or internal 
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combustion engine responsible for any negative impacts that these technolo-
gies have exercised on humanity since the 19th century. It does not occur to 
us to blame high costs of electricity and an ensuing increase in poverty on 
Edison or Faraday, or illnesses caused by inhalation of particulates on Ru-
dolf Diesel. However, if ‘should remain accountable’ were replaced with ‘care 
for the vulnerability of technology users’ within a finite time span of indi-
vidual quasi-parental responsibility, then such an excessive extension of re-
sponsibility would be altogether removed. 
Let us pause at this point to review the usefulness of the analogy with 
parental care. It is informative to the extent that it illustrates how the fu-
ture-oriented responsibilities of innovators, based on vulnerability, can be 
understood in terms of what mediates between present and future for care-
givers and for innovators – respectively, children and technological innova-
tions. The potentially paralyzing duty of care for the vulnerability of future 
people becomes concrete, as a result, in the idea of a duty to ‘teach’ or ‘en-
code’ the virtues in children or in created artefacts. But before we ask which 
virtues should be taught in this way, the analogy itself leads us to examine, 
beyond the individual dimension, the relationship between the innovator 
and the wider social order. To what extent does the technological innovator 
adopt a particular collective, hence political, role, in addition to the ‘parental’ 
one?  
Our analogy with parental responsibilities was presented to illustrate an 
important continuity between responsible innovation and extant conceptions 
of responsibility, to avoid an excessive and paralyzing concentration on the 
uniqueness of technological responsibility. We now examine a further conti-
nuity, between responsible innovation and collective that is, political respon-
sibility. This is relevant to innovation as bringing new social practices and 
even institutions that transform the ways in which human beings interact 
with their peers and the world around them.  
Society often believes that the innovator creates in order to serve some 
identified social need. The innovator herself may indeed be motivated by the 
desire to mend social injustice or to do social good. In her innovation, how-
ever, she contributes to a process that often reshapes the social and natural 
worlds in unforeseeable ways. In this sense, innovators are the unacknow-
ledged legislators and co-creators of the world. They thus adopt a political 
responsibility as part of a particular professional group engaged in a collec-
tive endeavour.  
Hannah Arendt’s analysis focuses on the collective aspect of responsibil-
ity and its implications for social groups. A German Jew who fled Germany 
in 1933, Arendt chose to turn her experience of ethical and social trauma 
into something beyond a question of her own, or anyone’s, individual ethics. 
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She did not ask whether an individual is good but whether his or her conduct 
is good for the world s/he lives in, and she emphasized the political dimen-
sion of her thought: “In the centre of interest is the world and not the self” 
(Arendt 1968, p. 151). The social structures observed by Arendt directed her 
attention to the notion of collective responsibility. By definition, collective 
responsibility occurs if the following two conditions are met: a person must 
be held responsible for something she has not done, and the reason for her 
responsibility must be her membership in a group which no voluntary act of 
hers can dissolve. Thus, all nuclear scientists share political responsibility for 
the human condition that we share in a world full of atomic power plants 
and nuclear weapons, notwithstanding their degree of personal involvement 
in the industry; or all scientists in general partake in shaping the world, 
whatever their individual research disciplines might be. Collective responsi-
bility looms large, not in considerations regarding individual actions based 
on personal convictions about what is right, but in political considerations of 
a group’s conduct. In contrast to, for example, Karl Jaspers (1947), Arendt 
maintains that collective responsibility is a concept quite distinct from the 
concept of guilt. She argued that the notion of collective guilt only serves to 
exculpate those individuals who are actually legally guilty of specific evils, 
while collective responsibility is a moral and political, but not a legal, phe-
nomenon, and relates to collective well-being under the changing technologi-
cal realities. This form of responsibility arises when complex social forces be-
come important that cannot be reduced to individual will or intent, but the 
responsibility for the consequences of the action of such forces is nevertheless 
attributed to individuals who compose the group: this is the case for innova-
tion! 
Collective political responsibility rests on historical continuity, flowing 
from the past and reaching out to embrace the future. The individual who 
recognises his or her implication in collective responsibility recognises that 
who she herself is, what she values and how she acts – in other words, her 
own identity – is inseparable from a social identity that is historical in na-
ture, and rooted within particular institutions. Taking responsibility means 
assuming an account of the history of the institutions to which one belongs, 
and which shape who one is, as much as it means assuming responsibility for 
shaping the future consequences of what they do with an eye on wider well-
being. Weighing the rights and wrongs of an action here goes beyond, for ex-
ample, simply concentrating on the narrow technical benefits of an inven-
tion. The innovator, as bearer of a political responsibility specific to his or 
her social role, has to ask herself about the wider social and political signifi-
cance of what she intends to accomplish, and what her actions may accom-
plish despite her intentions. Here, the limitations of traditional considera-
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tions of role responsibility are again apparent: the responsibilities one as-
sumes when playing a role are a medium through which one enters the po-
litical sphere, and the role itself is but a gate that leads to an arena where 
moral judgement takes place. 
On the group level, Arendt’s conditions for collective responsibility fully 
apply to “naturalised technologies”. The perceived autonomy of these arte-
facts is due to the fact that the internal functioning of complex technological 
devices remains opaque for the layperson. Science is perceived as a mysteri-
ous force that produces useful artefacts, i.e., a kind of modern magic. How-
ever, even if we acknowledge the autonomy and ubiquity of modern technol-
ogy, the layperson will distinguish it from magic or fairy tales in that s/he 
knows that there exist living people, namely scientists and engineers, whose 
‘participation’ in the inner workings of science and technology is ‘direct’: 
they are the initiates. Hence their collective responsibility: as seen by soci-
ety, any scientist is engaged in ‘secret’ production of artefacts that will leave 
a deep mark on every man’s life. No act of his or her own, even if s/he exits 
the institution of science completely, will return the scientist to the status of 
layperson, as long as his or her past scientific training and occupation remain 
known to the group. Particularly paradoxical cases of political responsibility 
arise when scientists working in a certain discipline are held responsible for 
what has been done in a very different domain. The intra-scientific differ-
ences that are evident to the initiates remain socially invisible, and, as a con-
sequence, politically irrelevant.  
We have argued so far that responsible innovation means taking respon-
sibility in ways that are, respectively, quasi-parental and political in nature. 
The quasi-parental way of taking responsibility implies a limited kind of in-
dividual responsibility that focuses upon the duty of care for the malleability 
of technological artefacts and the vulnerability of their future users. How-
ever, being vulnerable is no guarantee that either the technological artefact 
or the person will act virtuously: a victim may turn into a persecutor of 
those who took care of him/her, given the right circumstances. If the innova-
tor who takes care of the “virtues” of his or her creations is blamed for any 
unintended consequences, the reaction will primarily be internal rather than 
external: s/he will feel ashamed and in conflict with his or her own con-
science, rather than being liable in the eyes of society and perhaps punished 
under the law. The latter, political form of responsibility is collective, and 
the “politics” to which it refers is not the usual kind. The relevant line of di-
vision within society runs, not between opposed alliances (such as those on 
the political left and the right) that represent contrasting interpretations of 
the “public good”, but between technological initiates and technological 
laypeople, who may very well vote identically at elections but may well not 
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form the same opinion where the contribution of technological innovation is 
at stake. How these two groups can live together, and what they ought to do 
in order to maintain peaceful coexistence, is the central challenge posed by 
the innovator’s specific political vocation. Its collective dimension implies 
that no one person, however knowledgeable about science and technology, 
can single-handedly answer this question. The timescale over which evolves 
the division line between laypeople and the initiates is larger than the scale 
of usual politics and its actors are diffused and impersonal: on the left (or 
right), naturalised technologies, on the opposite side, a world-wide constitu-
ency of their users crossing all national and natural frontiers. Decision-
making in this political configuration is often implicit, and its consequences 
take years if not decades to become visible.  
Among the two types of non-consequentialist responsibility we have dis-
cussed, quasi-parental responsibility in particular relies on ‘teaching’ certain 
virtues. This is fundamental, as moral judgement that depends on passion as 
well as reason includes an emotional evaluation of the technological artefact 
and the innovator who created it. Preparing to assume such kinds of respon-
sibility is typically not a part of the training received by scientists, industrial 
entrepreneurs, or managers of scientific institutions. The non-
consequentialist character of responsible innovation we have suggested must 
require particular forms of education. Without wanting to map out in detail 
what the virtues of the innovator might be, or the educational means of cre-
ating them, we present in the closing pages of this chapter a framework for 
thinking about them. 
A silent alchemist who once unleashed natural processes in the darkness 
of a laboratory has, with the centrality of innovation to globalised, techno-
logical societies, become a political individual whom we call an innovator or 
technological entrepreneur. The political question asked by contemporary 
technological societies of such individuals is: in the first place, why would 
innovators wish to make a pact with the sleeping powers of Nature? What 
did they want to achieve? Both the goal and the very desire to achieve it are 
ethically suspect and subject to scrutiny. Here we should pause and reflect 
on the problem of desire as such, and more generally on the place of passion 
in the judgement of moral responsibility, for when human desire is impli-
cated within any ethical framework governing one’s actions, what counts is 
whether there are clearly demarcated limits to it, and not simply whether 
acting brings results which fulfill the desire. As Davies and Macnaghten 
(2010) note in a seemingly paradoxical finding in their study of lay percep-
tions of technology, “getting exactly what you want may not ultimately be 
good for you”. What exactly does this imply for responsible innovation? 
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We answer this question from a philosophical and practical point of view 
that rests on two pillars. The first, as we have already discussed, is that by 
their very nature science and technology, like any creative process, exceed 
the limits of prudence. There is continuity between the human condition 
that they contribute to create and the condition, explored in literature, of a 
hero who confronts powerful natural forces. In his well-known poem “The 
Age of Anxiety”, W. H. Auden contrasts the demands of pure engineering: 
“The prudent atom // Simply insists upon its safety now, // Security at all 
costs,” with the forces that govern and reward desire and ambition: “Nature 
rewards // Perilous leaps” (Auden 1947/2011, p. 7) Hence, if responsible in-
novation is something more than a rephrased safety protocol, it must inevi-
tably address, not just reason, but also passion which inhabits  a courageous 
innovator preparing to make a perilous leap. 
This analogy between modern innovator and literary hero might help to 
reveal unexpected moral difficulties to be faced by the former. Scientific dis-
covery and its ensuing transformation into successful technology depend on 
multiple factors: assiduous research, for sure, but also serendipity and fa-
vourable business opportunities. We learn from literature that the latter 
aren’t morally innocent: by saying “O opportunity, thy guilt is great”, 
Shakespeare famously made in The Rape of Lucrece a moral judgement so 
puzzling that it either calls for a mythological personification of ‘guilty’ 
chance (his own solution) or, for the analytic mind, it reveals the need to 
open up the Shakespearean shortcut from ‘opportunity’ to ‘guilt’, by spelling 
out what elements may form this chain of logic. This is where the moral sus-
piciousness of desire comes into play. Under some circumstances, getting ex-
actly what one wants may lead one to unforeseen disasters and catastrophes: 
“be wary of what you wish for....” These circumstances exist when what may 
potentially be wished for is itself boundless, like the never-ending techno-
logical progress, which can be the cause both of great expectations and of the 
disruption of the community (Dupuy 2010).  
This moral conundrum is now unknown in history. The notion that too 
much success incurs a supernatural danger, especially if one brags about it, 
has appeared independently in many different cultures and is deeply rooted 
in human nature (Dodds 1951, p. 30). Ancient Greek mythology and later 
Greek thought distinguish between four different kinds of circumstances: 
successful action may provoke jealousy of the gods (phthonos), it may lead to 
divine retribution (nemesis), it may cause complacency of the man who has 
done too well (koros), or it may lead to arrogance in word, deed or thought 
(hubris). Hubris is condemned by the Greek society and punished by law, but 
reaction to the other three is more subtle. Phthonos and nemesis are danger-
ous and must be feared. The attitude that the Greeks have towards koros is 
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rather ambivalent: the complacency assumed in this notion makes someone’s 
life untenable, however koros can hardly be avoided, for it goes hand in hand 
with ambition, or the inability to put an end to one’s desire of great 
achievements, called philotimia. In a telling example, a modern commenta-
tor connects Ulysses’s hardships with his philotimia in a way that bears 
striking resemblance with the innovator and his or her limitless desire to 
bring new technologies to life: “[it] condemns Ulysses to a hard life, for he 
must constantly live up to the height of new dangers, unless the reputation 
of his past deeds be tarnished. Peace of mind is forbidden to him, because he 
depends on a reputation placed under continuous threat” (Gangloff 2006, p. 
103-104, our translation from French). In the later centuries of Greek 
thought we find an explicit argument describing the moral condition of a 
man who has achieved great technical feats as “always on fire from fervour”, 
his soul “consumed by a continuous suite of loves, hopes and desires”, the 
reason being that “the sweetness of success lures him into a painful ordeal of 
the worst misfortunes”  (Festugière 1954, our translation from French). Thus 
perfect success forbids peace of mind, and, by way of analogy between an-
cient and modern ethical thought, this is at the same time a part of the in-
novator’s human condition and a moral problem of its own. The impossibil-
ity to limit one’s desire endlessly amplifies ambition, and the only way to 
escape from this eternal fire is via balancing one’s desire with humility that 
would help to restore one’s mind to peace. How exactly this can be achieved, 
and whether this is at all possible, cannot be answered in full generality; 
what needs to be done instead is an educational effort that would teach the 
individual to compensate his or her own virtue of scientific ambition with 
virtuous lucidity, inasmuch as the moral standing of this ambition is con-
cerned, thus contributing to an accrued sense of innovator’s responsibility. 
The second pillar is the importance of stories for ethical thinking. Several 
recent publications insist on their relevance, both practically observed and 
theoretically motivated, for understanding public perception of new tech-
nologies (Davies and Macnaghten 2010; Ferrari and Nordmann 2010; Dupuy 
2010; Grinbaum 2010). Ancient and modern narratives become part and par-
cel of the social reading of technology, making it impossible to tackle ethical 
questions that it raises without an evocation of mythological personifica-
tions of various technical feats and the ensuing moral punishment, e.g., 
Prometheus, Daedalus, or Pandora. Thinking about moral questions with 
the help of stories is to virtue ethics what cost-benefit analysis is to conse-
quentialism, and the ever more evident irrelevance of consequentialism to 
the present science-society situation makes it urgent to resort to other tools 
of dealing with the growing number of problems. We survey here two such 
stories that are particularly relevant for the analysis of responsibility. As 
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with all myths or narratives, they do not contain a direct answer to the 
moral question that they explore. Rather, they proceed by encouraging the 
scientist and the innovator to reflect on the sides of moral judgement that 
typically are not a part of his or her rational toolkit. If consequentialism 
cannot but fail to predict the exact future consequences because of their high 
uncertainty, one can still imagine what future ethical implications might be 
by resorting to cultural narratives. Their interpretation may reveal a surpris-
ing degree of analogy with the scientific and technological work of modern 
scientists and engineers. 
The first story concerns Rabbi Judah Loew of Prague, to whom a legend 
ascribes the creation of an artificial man called the Golem of Prague. Rabbi 
Loew wrote, “Everything that God created requires repair and completion” 
(Sherwin 2004, p. 53). On this interpretation of a Biblical verse in Genesis 
2:3, which isn’t uncommon in the Jewish tradition, the world was “created 
to be made”: God has not finished his creation and therefore human beings 
receive a mandate to act as “God’s partners in the act of creation”, by devel-
oping raw materials and unleashing the sleeping powers of Nature. Not only 
is innovation per se free of sin; it is encouraged and praised as a mandatory 
activity in one’s fulfilment of his human potential. Like modern technology 
that is said to serve societal needs, in the Jewish tradition human creativity 
is always purposeful: Judah Loew creates the Golem of Prague, not on a 
whim or for pleasure, but in order to protect the city’s Jewish community 
from the many threats they encountered in the gloomy streets of Prague in 
1580. Once unleashed, the golem obeyed Judah Loew’s commands and suc-
cessfully protected the Prague ghetto for about ten years. Then, according to 
one popular version of the story, the golem went berserk, at which point 
Judah Loew was summoned and told to do something to stop the golem’s 
wrongdoing. He ‘unmade’ the golem by a procedure that was, ‘technically’ 
speaking, the reverse of the method he had used to make him. 
This legend exemplifies several typical features of the many golem sto-
ries in Jewish literature that may cast new light on modern science and 
technology. In reflecting on such stories, we may learn more about the com-
plexities of moral judgment. Points of comparison between the golem leg-
ends and modern techno-science include: (a) purposefulness: a golem is made 
on purpose by a human creator with a specific goal in mind, while modern 
technology is often justified before society as being created in order to serve 
identified social needs; (b) reversibility: a golem can be both made and un-
made through a fixed procedure, while modern technological innovation can 
change the world so dramatically that one can hardly envisage going back; 
(c) machine-like obedience: the creator commands his creation at will and 
the latter obeys the former, while modern naturalized technologies gain a 
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form of autonomy that demands they be granted a special, intermediate so-
cial and moral status; (d) responsibility: when golem’s actions become harm-
ful, the community tells Judah Loew to repair the damage. Responsibility 
for the golem’s conduct falls upon his creator rather than upon the golem 
himself, and this in spite of the fact that the golem behaved and looked more 
or less like an autonomous human being. This is strikingly similar to the 
quasi-parental responsibility of the innovator we have discussed earlier. 
The second story concerns Mary Shelley’s novel about Victor Franken-
stein, which displays a different set of characteristics (Shelley 2009/1818). 
Unlike Judah Loew, Frankenstein, who created a monster, cannot undo 
what he had done: the monster wouldn’t obey him and escapes his power al-
together. The process unleashed here is irreversible, but even as it begins to 
produce terrible consequences (as the story develops the monster kills several 
people), Frankenstein keeps his moral perplexities to himself. He evidently 
refuses to acknowledge any political dimension of his action. His responsibil-
ity with regard to society, which happens not to be imposed on him by legal 
or any other external threat to his own person, proceeds exclusively from his 
own conscience. And although he is perturbed by the monster’s actions, he 
does not reveal that he has created it, nor does he admit what he knows of its 
deeds, thus allowing one person falsely accused of murder to be executed. 
What places him in this position is the modern version of what Augustine of 
Hippo called the “lust of the eyes” (398/2000, Ch. 35; O’Neill, 1993, pp. 155-
59), the desire for scientific truth and technical achievement above any other 
effect produced by the innovator’s desire. The story then goes on to explore 
the consequences of Frankenstein’s failure to admit his political responsibil-
ity. Soon the monster promises to put an end to both his and others’ suffer-
ing if Frankenstein makes for him a second artificial creature to become his 
wife. Seduced by an easy technical solution to the problem of social evil, 
Frankenstein complies and begins to work on the second monster, only to 
realize a little later that by making this new creature he would unleash yet 
another irreversible process out of his control. He refuses to finish the second 
being and flees the country and all human company, apparently unable to 
cope with a moral burden.  
Shelley’s verdict is unequivocal: Frankenstein’s creative activity was 
morally wrong, for it failed to stand up to the moral and political challenges 
it had itself generated. But why precisely was it wrong? Unlike Judah Loew, 
Victor Frankenstein created the monster without a particular societal goal 
— is this is the source of evil? Or is it the lack of reversibility? Or the lack of 
control, whereby the monster’s autonomy placed him altogether out of his 
creator’s control? A small episode in the novel reveals further complexity by 
proposing a parabola about the source of evil in the monster, which we can 
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interpret as a story about good and evil in modern technology (Pavlopoulos 
et al. 2010, Ch. 5): after the monster’s initial escape from Frankenstein, he 
finds refuge in a hovel next to a small house inhabited by a blind man and 
his two children. By observing the family and reading their books, the mon-
ster learns human language. Gradually he warms up to the poor family and 
started to secretly help them. One day, longing for mutual kindness, he de-
cides to come out to his hosts. First he enters into a conversation with the 
blind man and is received warmly by him. But when the children arrive and 
see the monster, they beat him and throw him into the street. At this mo-
ment the monster puts an end to his righteous conduct and turns to wrong-
doing. 
This episode mingles the usual theme inherited from the Golem legends 
(that social success and the moral status of one’s novel creation depend on 
the purity of the creator’s intentions), with the unpredictability of nonethe-
less morally relevant consequences, otherwise known as moral luck. Shelley 
contends that evil influence in the monster is not necessarily due to a lack of 
reversibility in the original innovation, nor of course to Frankenstein’s re-
vealed evil intentions, but to the human conduct on which the monster mod-
els his own behaviour. When the blind man’s children beat the creature, he 
learns from experience, and henceforth starts to spread evil himself. Taking 
this episode as a metaphor for the condition of modern technology, one 
might contend that the responsibility for misuse of technological innovation 
belongs with the society rather than the inventor; technology would not be 
prone to misuse per se, nor would such misuse be inevitable. If it occurs, then 
it is rooted in the environment in which technology operates rather than be-
ing encoded deterministically in the technical object. In other words, as we 
frequently hear today, moral judgement depends on how technical objects 
are used, while the existence of the object itself is neither good nor bad. 
Yet Shelley gives reasons to doubt this interpretation. Whether the 
source of the monster’s wrongdoing is in his creator or in a random chain of 
events that happened to the monster after his escape, Victor Frankenstein 
still feels an unbearable responsibility that forces him to flee and abandon 
both his work and his world. Hence evil done by the monster has something 
to do with Frankenstein himself. When the latter puts to a halt the creation 
of the second being, it is not because he suddenly mistrusts the monster’s 
promise to live peacefully in the woods with his future partner. Rather, he 
realizes that episodes such as the meeting between the monster and blind 
man’s children are inevitable because they are a consequence of his own fi-
niteness, and of the dark side that is inherent to Frankenstein as human 
creator. Angelic, purely righteous beings cannot subsist, as Melville will 
make clear a few decades after Shelley’s novel by putting to death his Billy 
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Budd (Melville 1924; Rey 2011). Frankenstein knows that his political re-
sponsibility for what the monster will do to the society, although not limit-
less, is nevertheless very real: he cannot come to terms with his conscience, 
affirms his own responsibility although no legal threats are made against 
him, and flees society. 
To some extent, the innovator today is put in all these different situa-
tions at once: on the one hand, society exerts pressure on him if his work 
proves harmful; on the other, by turning inwards and interrogating his or 
her own conscience, the innovator must make a choice between his or her 
ambitions and desires, and face moral judgment even if (or perhaps, espe-
cially if) they are successfully realized. Yet there is no universal answer as to 
how to translate the lessons of old stories into action in the present. Even as 
one strives to possess the requisite virtues of the responsible innovator: to 
bind one’s desire, to check ambition by humility, and to maintain both in-
ternal interrogation and external dialogue about the meaning of one’s ac-
tions, there is no guarantee that moral luck in the uncertain future will not 
mean that one’s efforts to act responsibly will not turn out to have unin-
tended consequences. Whatever choices are made, the final verdict on a dis-
tinction between responsible and irresponsible innovation is not in our ca-
pacity to make. No one can vouch that his action is an adequate expression 
of the virtues of a responsible innovator: rather, living up to the demands of 
responsibility is a lifelong process. 
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